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Abstract
This thesis describes how an elliptic curve cryptosystem can be implemented on low
cost microprocessors without coprocessors with reasonable performance. We focus in
this paper on the Intel 8051 family of microcontrollers popular in smart cards and
other cost-sensitive devices, and on the Motorola Dragonball, found in the Palm Com-
puting Platform. The implementation is based on the use of the Optimal Extension
Fields GF ((28 − 17)17) for low end 8-bit processors, and GF ((213 − 1)13) for 16-bit
processors.
Two advantages of our method are that subfield modular reduction can be
performed infrequently, and that an adaption of Itoh and Tsujii’s inversion algorithm
may be used for the group operation. We show that an elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication with a fixed point, which is the core operation for a signature generation,
can be performed in a group of order approximately 2134 in less than 2 seconds on
an 8-bit smart card. On a 16-bit microcontroller, signature generation in a group of
order approximately 2169 can be performed in under 700 milliseconds. Unlike other
implementations, we do not make use of curve parameters defined over a subfield such
as Koblitz curves.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Why ECC?
The challenge addressed in this thesis is to implement a public-key digital signa-
ture algorithm on embedded systems which neither introduces performance problems
nor requires additional hardware. To approach this problem, we turn to the com-
putational savings made available by elliptic curve cryptosystems. An elliptic curve
cryptosystem relies on the assumed hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (ECDLP) for its security. An instance of the ECDLP is posed for an elliptic
curve defined over a finite field GF (pm) for p a prime and m a positive integer. The
rule to perform the elliptic curve group operation can be expressed in terms of arith-
metic operations in the finite field; thus the speed of the field arithmetic determines
the speed of the cryptosystem.
Two target platforms are chosen to represent the broad spectrum of embedded
systems. The first target is an 8-bit microcontroller, the Intel 8051, derivatives of
which are on many popular smart cards such as the Infineon SLE44C200 and Philips
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82C852. The second target is a 16-bit microcontroller, the Motorola MC68328, found
in the popular Palm and Visor handheld PDAs. The implementation is focused
on efficient software algorithms for finite field arithmetic and efficient ECC point
multiplication with a fixed point on embedded µPs.
In Chapter 5, we compare the finite field arithmetic performance offered on an
8-bit microcontroller by three different types of finite field which have been proposed
for elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs): binary fields GF (2n), binary composite fields
GF ((2n)m), and finally Optimal Extension Fields (OEFs): GF (pm) for p a pseudo-
Mersenne prime, m chosen so that an irreducible binomial exists over GF (p). Our
results show that core field arithmetic operations in GF (2n) lag behind the other two
at a ratio of 5:1. The arithmetic offered by OEFs and composite fields is comparable
in performance. However, the recent result of Gaudry, Hess, and Smart [GHS00] has
shown that the ECDLP can be easily solved when certain composite fields are used.
Thus, in the main part of this thesis we present the results of applying OEFs to the
construction of ECCs to calculate digital signatures on embedded platforms within a
reasonable processing time with no need for additional coprocessor hardware.
1.2 Why embedded platforms?
“While the Internet creates a new cyberspace separate from our physical
world, technological advances will enable ubiquitous networked computing
in our day-to-day lives. The power of this ubiquity will follow from the
embedding of computation and communications in the physical world–
that is, embedded devices with sensing and communication capabilities
that enable distributed computation [EGH00].”
Technological improvements have made possible the development of power-
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ful, low cost and low power microprocessors. These devices have already begun to
be incorporated into our every day lives, each responsible for keeping track of our
addresses, appointments, messages, etc. Furthermore, while these devices become
increasingly connected, the communication channels between them remain highly in-
secure. Thus we have a situation that demands the use of cryptography, but does not
possess quite enough power to run the traditional algorithms in a reasonable amount
of time. Constrained environments present a difficult challenge, where every possible
optimization must be used simply to enable the very use of security.
As mentioned above, some examples of these embedded systems are already
prevalent, while others are still on the horizon. A prime example of an embedded
system in need of security is the cell phone. The popularity of cell phones is growing,
and FCC has required GPS capabilities be added by 2005 to facilitate location by
911 services. Without proper security, this functionality could be exploited to enable
the accurate and automatic tracking of individuals by those with malicious intent.
In other areas, the emergence of local wireless communication technologies such as
Bluetooth, IRDA, and IEEE 802.11 is enabling interconnection among smaller de-
vices. On the horizon, efforts are being made to interconnect household appliances
and provide connectivity to devices within automobiles. Many of these systems need
security to enable the protection of data privacy and integrity.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
The use of elliptic curve cryptosystems is relatively new. They were introduced in-
dependently by Victor Miller [Mil86] and Neil Koblitz [Kob87], and have since been
a popular research area. The reason elliptic curves (EC) are so tempting for crypto-
graphic use is because the key lengths are significantly shorter than those of public-
key (PK) systems based on the integer factorization or finite field discrete logarithm
problem. According to the IEEE 1363 standards specification [IEE00], an RSA key
of 1024 bits is considered security equivalent to an elliptic curve cryptosystem with
keys of 172 bits. The cost of complex mathematical operations increases significantly
with the length of their operands.
The primary operation in an ECC is scalar-point multiplication C = kP ,
where P is a point on the curve and k is an integer. The multiplication is performed
using the group operation detailed in the following section.
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2.1.1 Group Operation
An elliptic curve can be viewed as the set of all solutions to an equation of the form
y2 = x3 + ax + b. (2.1)
It is possible to turn this set of points into an Abelian group; the operation is called
“point addition.” This operation adds two curve points, and results in another point
on the curve. We restrict our attention to points all of whose coordinates lie in
some given finite field GF (q) containing a and b. These are referred to as GF (q)-
rational points. We denote by E(GF (q)) the group of all GF (q)-rational points and
use #E(GF (q)) for the order of this group. Using an ECC for signatures involves
the repeated application of the group law. The group law using affine coordinates is
shown below [Men93].
Definition 2.1: If P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(GF (q)), then −P = (x1,−y1). If Q = (x2, y2) ∈
E(GF (q)), Q 6= −P, then P + Q = (x3, y3), where
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, (2.2)
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1, (2.3)
λ =


y2−y1
x2−x1
, if P 6= Q,
3x2
1
+a
2y1
, if P = Q.
(2.4)
For fields of characteristric two or three, the expressions are slightly different.
The λ term is calculated depending on the relationship of P and Q. If they
are equal, then a point doubling is performed, using the second equation. Note that
λ is undefined if the points are additive inverses, or if either point is zero. These
conditions must be examined before the group operation is performed.
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2.2 Finite Fields
To implement an ECC, an implementor must select an underlying finite field in
which to perform arithmetic calculations. A finite field is identified with the no-
tation GF (pm) for p a prime and m a positive integer. It is well known that there
exists a finite field for all primes p and positive integers m. Any such field is iso-
morphic to GF (p)[x]/(P (x)), where P (x) = xm +
∑m−1
i=0 pi x
i, pi ∈ GF (p), is a monic
irreducible polynomial of degree m over GF (p). In the following, each residue class
will be identified with the unique polynomial of least degree in this class.
Various finite fields admit the use of different algorithms for arithmetic. Un-
surprisingly, the choices of p, m, and P (x) can have a dramatic impact on the per-
formance of the ECC. In particular, there are generic algorithms for arithmetic in an
arbitrary finite field and there are specialized algorithms which provide better perfor-
mance in finite fields of a particular form. In the following, we briefly describe field
types proposed for ECC.
2.2.1 Binary Fields
Implementors designing custom hardware for an ECC often choose p = 2 and P (x) to
be a trinomial or pentanomial. Such choices of irreducible polynomial lead to efficient
methods for extension field modular reduction. We will refer to this type of field as a
“binary field,” in accordance with [IEE00]. The elements of the subfield GF (2) can
be represented by the logical signals 0 and 1. In this way, it is possible to construct
fast and area efficient hardware circuits to perform the finite field arithmetic. Binary
fields are also popular for software implementations of ECC.
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2.2.2 Binary Composite Fields
In software, the choice of parameters varies considerably with the wide array of avail-
able microprocessors. Many authors have suggested the use of p = 2 and m a com-
posite number, e.g. [DBV+96, GP97]. In this case, the field GF (2m) is isomorphic to
GF ((2s)r), for m = sr and we call this a “composite field.” Then multiplication and
inversion in the subfield GF (2s) can be efficiently performed by index table look-up
if s is not too large. In turn, these operations in the extension field GF ((2s)r) are
computed using arithmetic in the subfield. As in the binary field case, the irreducible
polynomials for both the subfield and the extension field are chosen to have minimal
weight. This approach can provide superior performance when compared to the case
of binary fields. However, a recent attack against ECCs over composite fields [GHS00]
makes their use in practice questionable.
2.2.3 Prime Fields
Prime fields, where m = 1 are perhaps the most obvious finite fields to use. For
ECC, a typical prime is chosen to be larger than 2160, and must be stored in multiple
computer words. The problem with this representation is that during computation,
the carries between words must be propagated, and the reduction modulo p must be
performed over several words. There has been a large amount of research dealing
with methods for doing long-number multi-precision arithmetic efficiently. Perhaps
the most popular method in this context is based on Montgomery reduction [Mon85].
Background 8
2.2.4 Optimal Extension Fields
An alternative construction is to use optimal extension fields (OEFs) [BP98], defined
as follows. Choose p of the form 2n ± c, for n, c arbitrary positive integers, where
log2(c) ≤ b12nc. In this case, one chooses p of appropriate size to use the multiply
instructions available on the target microcontroller. In addition, m is chosen so that
an irreducible binomial P (x) = xm − ω exists, ω ∈ GF (p). The algorithmic and
implementation details for OEFs will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
To generate “good” elliptic curves over OEFs there are two basic approaches.
The first one is based on the use of a curve defined over GF (p) using the method
in [BSS99, Section VI.4]. The second, more general, method uses Schoof’s algorithm
together with its improvements.
Chapter 3
Previous Work
3.1 Previous Work
This section reviews some of the most relevant previous contributions. It has been
long recognized that efficient finite field arithmetic is vital to achieve acceptable per-
formance with ECCs. Before an attack was published making their use in practice
questionable, many implementors chose even-characteristic finite fields with compos-
ite extension degree.
A paper due to De Win et al. [DBV+96] analyzes the use of fields GF ((2n)m),
with a focus on n = 16, m = 11. This construction yields an extension field with 2176
elements. The subfield GF (216) has a Cayley table of sufficiently small size to fit in
the memory of a workstation. Optimizations for multiplication and inversion in such
composite fields of characteristic two are described in [GP97].
Schroeppel et al. [SOOS95] report an implementation of an elliptic curve ana-
logue of Diffie-Hellman key exchange over GF (2155). The arithmetic is based on a
polynomial basis representation of the field elements. Another paper by De Win
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et.al. [DMPW98] presents a detailed implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic on
a desktop PC, using finite fields of the form GF (p) and GF (2n), with a focus on its
application to digital signature schemes. For ECCs over prime fields, it is possible to
use projective coordinates to eliminate the need for inversion, along with a balanced
ternary representation of the multiplier.
The work in [Bai98, BP98] introduces OEFs and provides performance statis-
tics on high-end RISC workstations. Odd characteristic extension fields for use in
cryptography were introduced independently by Preda Miha˘ilescu in a rump session
in [Mih97]. A paper extending the work on OEFs appears in [KMKH99]. In this
paper, sub-millisecond performance on high-end RISC workstations is reported. Fur-
ther, the authors achieve an ECC performance of 1.95 msec on a 400 MHz Pentium
II with a field of order 2186. Reference [BP01] describes the Itoh-Tsujii inversion
algorithm for OEFs which is used in this contribution.
In [NM96], Naccache and M’Ra¨ıhi provide an overview of smart cards with
cryptographic capabilities, including a discussion of general implementation concerns
on various types of smart cards. In [NMWdP95] a zero-knowledge system on an 8-bit
microprocessor without a coprocessor is presented.
In a white paper [Cer98], Certicom Corp. provides an implementation overview
for an ECC defined over GF (2163) on smart card CPUs without cryptographic copro-
cessors.
Chapter 4
Relevant Algorithms
The key to a successful and efficient implementation of a cryptosystem is the choice
of algorithms to optimize the arithmetic. While a multitude of algorithms exist, it is
important to carefully choose the best combination. In this chapter, we will discuss
the primary algorithms used in this implementation.
4.1 Karatsuba Multiplication
Extension field multiplication is the most costly basic arithmetic function in OEFs.
For a given extension field of order n, n2 subfield multiplications are required to mul-
tiply two values using traditional polynomial multiplication. It is shown in [Knu81]
that this can be reduced drastically in certain cases. Using a method developed by
Karatsuba and Ofman [KO63], the number of multiplications can be reduced in ex-
change for an increased number of additions. As long as the time ratio for executing
a multiplication vs. an addition is high, this tradeoff is more efficient.
A basic example of Karatsuba is given here to demonstrate its usefulness.
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Given two degree-1 polynomials, A(x) and B(x), we can demonstrate the traditional
and the Karatsuba methods.
A(x) = a1x + a0
B(x) = b1x + b0
For the traditional method, we must calculate the product of each possible
pair of coefficients.
D0 = a0b0
D1 = a0b1
D2 = a1b0
D3 = a1b1
Now we can calculate the product C(x) = A(x) ·B(x) as:
C(x) = D3x
2 + (D2 + D1)x + D0
The Karatsuba method begins by taking the same two polynomials, and cal-
culating the following three products:
E0 = a0b0
E1 = a1b1
E2 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1)
These are then used to assemble the result C(x) = A(x) ·B(x):
C(x) = E1x
2 + (E2 − E1 − E0)x + E0
It is easy to verify the results are equal.
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We can now look at how many operations are required for each method. The
traditional method requires four multiplications and one addition, while the Karat-
suba method requires three multiplications and four additions. Thus we have traded a
single multiplication for three additions. If the cost to multiply on the target platform
is as least three times the cost to add, then the method is effective. While this basic
form of Karatsuba was presented in the original paper, there are a number of ways
this method may be expanded to handle larger degree polynomials. This is shown in
[WP01], where the authors give an in-depth study of this method and its variations.
4.2 Itoh-Tsujii Inversion
Extension field inversion is normally a costly operation, but the nature of OEFs
allows the reduction of the extension field inversion to a subfield inversion. The Itoh-
Tsujii algorithm [IT88] which was originally developed for use with composite fields
GF (2n
m
) in a normal basis representation can be applied to extension fields GF (qm)
in polynomial representation as shown in [GP01]. It is assumed that the subfield
inverse can be calculated by efficient means, such as table-lookup or the Euclidean
algorithm, given a small order of the subfield. To perform the OEF inversion, we use
the following expression:
A−1 = (Ar)−1Ar−1, where r =
qm − 1
q − 1 . (4.1)
Algorithm 4.1 shows the general case for inversion. It is key to observe that
Ar ∈ GF (q). Since r is known ahead of time, an efficient addition chain for the
exponentiation in Step 1 can be precomputed and hardcoded into the algorithm.
This can be seen in Algorithms 5.3 and 6.1 where the complete process including the
addition chains are shown for the 8-bit and 16-bit fields. In general, an addition chain
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Algorithm 4.1 General ITI Algorithm in GF (qm)
Require: A ∈ GF (qm)
Ensure: C ≡ A−1 mod P (x)
1: B ← Ar−1 (using an addition chain)
2: b ← BA = Ar−1A = Ar ∈ GF (q)
3: b ← b−1 = (Ar)−1
4: C ← bB = (Ar)−1Ar−1 = A−1
can be formed utilizing blog2(m−1)c+WH(m−1)−1 extension field multiplications,
where WH(m− 1) denotes the Hamming weight.
To further reduce the complexity, we utilize the Frobenius map to compute
the exponentiations of A occurring in the addition chain. As shown in [BP01], for
an OEF with a binomial field polynomial, the pth iteration of the Frobenius map
requires at most m− 1 multiplications in GF (q).
4.3 de Rooij Point Multiplication
As explained in Section 2.1, the primary operation in an elliptic curve cryptosystem
is point multiplication, C = kP . For large k, computing kP is a costly endeavor.
However, well-studied techniques used for ordinary integer exponentiation can be
advantageously adapted to this setting. The most basic of these algorithms is the
binary-double-and-add algorithm [Knu81]. It has a complexity of log2(k) + WH(k)
group operations, where WH is the Hamming weight of the multiplier k. On average,
then, we can expect this algorithm to require 1.5 log2(k) group operations. Using more
advanced methods, such as signed digit, k-ary or sliding window, the complexity may
be reduced to approximately 1.2 log2(k) group operations on average [MvOV97].
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The situation is much better in applications where the point is known ahead of
time. The most common public-key operation for a smart card or PDA is to provide a
digital signature. The ECDSA algorithm [IEE00] involves the multiplication of a fixed
curve point by the user-generated private key as the core operation. Because the curve
point is known ahead of time, precomputations may be performed to expedite the
signing process. Using a method devised by de Rooij in [dR98], we are able to reduce
the number of group operations necessary by a factor of four over the binary-double-
and-add algorithm. The de Rooij algorithm is a variant of that devised by Brickell,
Gordon, McCurley, and Wilson [BGMW93], but requires far fewer precomputations.
A modified form of de Rooij is shown in Algorithm 4.2. Note that the step
shown in line 10 requires general point multiplication of AM by q, where 0 ≤ q < b.
This is accomplished using the binary-double-and-add algorithm. In [dR98], the
author remarks that during execution, q is rarely greater than 1.
The choice of t and b are very important to the operation of this algorithm.
They are defined such that bt+1 ≥ #E(GF (pm)). The algorithm must be able to
handle a multiplier, s, not exceeding the order of the elliptic curve. The number
of point precomputations and temporary storage locations is determined by t + 1,
while b represents the maximum size of the exponent words. Thus we need to find a
compromise between the two parameters. The values chosen for this implementation
are covered in Sections 5.4.4 and 6.3.3.
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Algorithm 4.2 EC Fixed Point Multiplication using Precomputation and Vector
Addition Chains
Require: {b0A, b1A, . . . , btA}, A ∈ E(GF (pm)), and s = ∑ti=0 sibi
Ensure: C = sA, C ∈ E(GF (pm))
1: Define M ∈ [0, t] such that zM ≥ zi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t
2: Define N ∈ [0, t], N 6= M such that zN ≥ zi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t, i 6= M
3: for i ← 0 to t do
4: Ai ← biA
5: zi ← si
6: end for
7: Determine M and N for {z0, z1, . . . , zt}
8: while zN ≥ 0 do
9: q ← bzM/zNc
10: AN ← qAM + AN – general point multiplication
11: zM ← zM mod zN
12: Determine M and N for {z0, z1, . . . , zt}
13: end while
14: C ← zMAM
Chapter 5
8-bit Implementation
5.1 Introduction to the 8051
A typical large-scale smart card application such as retail banking can entail the
manufacture, personalization, issuance, and support of millions of smart cards. Due
to the grand scale involved, the success of such an application is inherently linked
to careful cost management of each of these areas. However, budgetary constraints
must be weighed against the basic requirements for smart card security. The security
services offered by a smart card often include both data encryption and public-key
operations. Creation of a digital signature is often the most computationally intensive
operation demanded of a smart card.
Smart cards often use 8-bit microcontrollers derived from 1970s families such as
the Intel 8051 [YA95] and the Motorola 6805. The use of public-key algorithms such as
RSA or DSA, which are based on modular arithmetic with very long operands, on such
a processor predictably results in unacceptably long processing delays. To address this
problem, many smart card microcontroller manufacturers include additional on-chip
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hardware to accelerate long-number arithmetic operations. However, in cost-sensitive
applications it can be attractive to execute public-key operations on smart cards
without coprocessors.
5.2 Rough Performance Comparison of Field Types
Field multiplication is the time critical operation in most ECC realizations. To ad-
dress our need for fast field arithmetic in an ECC implemented on a smart card, we
compared three options for finite field arithmetic on a standard Intel 8051 running at
12 MHz. Due to the 8051’s internal clock division factor of 12, one internal clock cycle
is equivalent to one microsecond. Thus, these timings may be interpreted as either
internal clock cycles or microseconds. We implemented extension field multiplication
for the three candidates in assembly. We chose a field order of about 2135 which pro-
vides moderate security as will be discussed in Section 5.3 below. The field elements
are represented with a polynomial basis and we took advantage of the standard arith-
metic algorithms available for each. For the binary field GF (2135) a shift-and-add
algorithm was used to emulate a shift register multiplier. It should be noted that
faster techniques are available [ITT+99]. For the composite field GF ((28)17) a table
look-up is employed to realize subfield multiplication. Results are shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Extension field multiplication performance on an Intel 8051
Field appr. Field Order # Cycles for Multiply
GF (2135) 2135 19,600
GF ((28)17) 2136 7,479
GF ((28 − 17)17) 2134 5,084
Thus we see that generic binary fields offer performance which lags far behind
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the other two options. Further, certain composite fields have recently been shown to
have cryptographic weaknesses [GHS00]. This gives further evidence that OEFs are
the best choice for our application.
5.3 Remark on the Finite Field Order Chosen
In recent work, Lenstra and Verheul show that under particular assumptions, 990-bit
RSA and DSS systems may be considered to be of equivalent security to 135-bit ECC
systems [LV00a]. The authors further argue that 135-bit ECC keys are adequate for
commercial security in the year 2001. This notion of commercial security is based
on the hypothesis that a 56-bit block cipher offered adequate security in 1982 for
commercial applications.
The validation of this estimate has more recently been confirmed by the break-
ing of the ECC2K-108 challenge [HDdRL]. First, note that the field GF ((28 − 17)17)
has an order of about 2134. Breaking the Koblitz (or anomalous) curve cryptosystem
over GF (2108) required slightly more effort than a brute force attack against DES.
Hence, an ECC over a 134-bit field which does not use a subfield curve is by a factor
of
√
108 ·
√
226 ≈ 216 harder to break than the ECC2K-108 challenge or DES. Thus,
based on current knowledge of EC attacks, the system proposed here is roughly se-
curity equivalent to a 72-bit block cipher. This implies that an attack would require
about 65,000 times as much effort as breaking DES. Note also that factoring the
512-bit RSA challenge took only about 2% of the time required to break DES or the
ECC2K-108 challenge. This suggests that an ECC over the proposed field GF (23917)
offers far more security than the 512-bit RSA system which has been popular for
fielded smart card applications. In summary, we feel that our selection of field or-
der provides medium-term security which is sufficient for many current smart card
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applications.
Of course, the discussion above assumes that there are no special attacks
against ECCs over OEFs. This assumption seems to be valid at the time of writing
[GHS00].
5.4 Algorithms
When choosing an algorithm to implement on 8-bit processors, it is important that
the parameter choices are optimized for the target platform. The Intel 8051 offers
a multiply instruction which computes the product of two integers each less than
28 = 256. Thus, we chose a prime 28 − 17 = 239 as our field characteristic so
that multiplication of elements in the prime subfield can use the ALU’s multiplier. In
addition, the nature of the OEF leads to an efficient reduction method. Field elements
are represented as polynomials of degree up to 16, with coefficients in the prime
subfield GF (239). As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, the polynomial is reduced modulo
an irreducible polynomial, P (x) = xm − ω. In this implementation P (x) = x17 − 2.
The key performance advantage of OEFs is due to fast modular reduction in
the subfield. Given a prime, p = 2n−c, reduction is performed by dividing the number
x into two n-bit words. The upper bits of x are “folded” into the lower ones, leading
to a very efficient reduction. The central observation is that 2n ≡ c mod 2n − c. The
basic reduction step which reduces a 2n-bit value x to a result with 1.5n bits is given
by representing x = x12
n + x0, where x0, x1 < 2
n. Thus a reduction is performed by:
x ≡ x1c + x0 mod 2n − c, (5.1)
which takes one multiplication by c, one addition, and no divisions or inversions. As
will be seen in Section 5.4.1, the reduction principle for OEFs is expanded for the
implementation described here.
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Furthermore, calculating a multiplicative inverse over the 8-bit subfield is eas-
ily implemented with table look-up. There is a relative cost in increased codesize,
but the subfield inverse requires only two instructions. In contrast, a method such
as the Extended Euclidean Algorithm would require a great deal more processing
time. This operation is required for our optimized inversion algorithm, as described
in Section 5.4.3.
The elliptic curve group operation requires 2 multiplications, 1 squaring, 1
inversion, and a number of additions that are relatively fast compared with the first
three. In our case, squaring and inversion performance depends on the speed of mul-
tiplication. Therefore the speed of a single extension field multiplication determines
the speed of the group operation in general.
Addition is carried out in the extension field by m−1 component-wise additions
modulo p. Subtraction is performed in a similar manner.
5.4.1 Multiplication
Extension field multiplication is implemented as polynomial multiplication with a
reduction modulo the irreducible binomial P (x) = x17 − 2. This modular reduction
is implemented in an analogous manner to the subfield modular reduction outlined
above. First, we observe that xm ≡ ω mod xm − ω. This observation leads to the
general expression for this reduction, given by
C(x) ≡ c′m−1xm−1 + [ωc′2m−2 + c′m−2]xm−2 + · · ·
+[ωc′m+1 + c
′
1]x + [ωc
′
m + c
′
0] mod x
m − ω. (5.2)
Thus, the product C of a multiplication A × B can be computed as shown in Algo-
rithm 5.1.
As can be seen, extension field multiplication requires m2 GF (239) products
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Algorithm 5.1 Extension Field Multiplication
Require: A(x) =
∑
aix
i, B(x) =
∑
bix
i ∈ GF (23917)/P (x), where P (x) = xm −
ω; ai, bi ∈ GF (239); 0 ≤ i < 17
Ensure: C(x) =
∑
cix
i = A(x)B(x), ci ∈ GF (239)
First we calculate the intermediate values for c′i, i = 17, 18, . . . , 32.
c′17 ← a1b16 + a2b15 + . . . + a14b3 + a15b2 + a16b1
c′18 ← a2b16 + a3b15 + . . . + a15b3 + a16b2
. . .
c′31 ← a15b16 + a16b15
c′32 ← a16b16
Now calculate ci, i = 0, 1, . . . , 16.
c0 ← a0b0 + ωc′17 mod 239
c1 ← a0b1 + a1b0 + ωc′18 mod 239
. . .
c15 ← a0b15 + a1b14 + . . . + a14b1 + a15b0 + ωc′32 mod 239
c16 ← a0b16 + a1b15 + . . . + a14b2 + a15b1 + a16b0 mod 239
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Table 5.2: Inner product maximum value
1. one product multiplication has a maximum value of (p− 1)2
2. we accumulate 17 products, 16 of which are multiplied by ω = 2
3. ACCmax = 33(p− 1)2 = 1869252 = 1C85C4h < 221
aibj, and m−1 multiplications by ω when the schoolbook method for polynomial mul-
tiplication is used. These m2 + m− 1 subfield multiplications form the performance
critical part of a field multiplication. In the earlier OEF work [Bai98], [BP98], a sub-
field multiplication was performed as single-precision integer multiplication resulting
in a double-precision product with a subsequent reduction modulo p. For OEFs with
p = 2n ± c, c > 1, this approach requires 2 integer multiplications and several shifts
and adds using Algorithm 14.47 in [MvOV97]. A key idea of this contribution is to
deviate from this approach. We propose to perform only one reduction modulo p per
coefficient ci, i = 0, 1, . . . , 16. This is achieved by allowing the residue class of the
sum of integer products to be represented by an integer larger than p. The remain-
ing task is to efficiently reduce a result which spreads over more than two words.
Hence, we can reduce the number of reductions to m, while still requiring m2 +m−1
multiplications.
During the product calculations, we perform all required multiplications for a
resulting coefficient, accumulate a multi-word integer, and then perform a reduction.
The derivation of the maximum value for the multi-word integer ci before reduction
is shown in Table 5.2.
We now expand the basic OEF reduction shown in Equation (5.1) for multiple
words. As log2(ACCmax) = 21 bits, the number can be represented in the radix
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Table 5.3: Intermediate reduction maxima
1. Using Equation (5.3), given that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1C85C4h
2. max(x′) = 1734h, when x = 1BFFFFh.
3. Using Equation (5.4), given that 0 ≤ x′ ≤ 1734h
4. max(x′′) = 275h, when x′ = 16FFh.
28 with three digits. We observe 2n ≡ c (mod 2n − c) and 22n ≡ c2 (mod 2n − c).
Thus the expanded reduction for operands of this size is performed by representing
x = x22
2n + x12
n + x0, where x0, x1, x2 < 2
n. The first reduction is performed as
x′ ≡ x2c2 + x1c + x0 (mod 2n − c), (5.3)
noting that c2 = 289 ≡ 50 mod 239. The reduction is repeated, now representing
the previous result as x′ = x′12
n + x′0, where x
′
0, x
′
1 < 2
n. The second reduction is
performed as
x′′ ≡ x′1c + x′0 mod 2n − c. (5.4)
The maximum intermediate values through the reduction are shown in Ta-
ble 5.3. Line 1 shows the maximum sum after inner product addition. While this
value is the largest number that will be reduced, it is more important to find the
maximum value that can result from the reduction. This case can be found by max-
imizing x1 and x0 at the cost of reducing x2 by one. Looking at Table 5.3 again, this
value is shown in line 2, as is the resulting reduced value. The process is repeated
again in lines 3 and 4, giving us the maximum reduced value after two reductions.
Note that through two reductions, we reduced a 21-bit input to 13 bits, and
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finally to 10 bits. At this point in the reduction, we could perform the same reduction
again, but it would only provide a slight improvement. Adding x′′1c + x
′′
0 would result
in a 9-bit number. Therefore it is more efficient to write custom code to handle
various possibilities. Most important is to eliminate the two highest order bits, and
then to ensure the resulting 8-bit number is the least positive representative of its
residue class. The entire multiplication and reduction is shown in Algorithm 5.2.
To perform the three-word reduction requires three 8-bit multiplications and
then several comparative steps. After the first two multiplications, the inner product
sum has been reduced to a 13-bit number. If we were to reduce each inner product in-
dividually, every step starting at line 13 in Algorithm 5.2 would be required. Ignoring
the trailing logic, which would add quite a bit of time itself, this would require m = 17
multiplications as opposed to the three needed in Algorithm 5.2. By accumulating
inner products and performing a single reduction we have saved 14 multiplications,
plus additional time in trailing logic, per coefficient calculation.
5.4.2 Squaring
Extension field squaring is similar to multiplication, except that the two inputs are
equal. By modifying the standard multiplication routine, we are able to take advan-
tage of identical inner product terms. For example, c2 = a0b2 +a1b1 +a2b0 +ωc19, can
be simplified to c2 = 2a0a2 + a1
2 + ωc19. Further gain is accomplished by doubling
only one coefficient, reducing it, and storing the new value. This approach saves us
from recalculating the doubled coefficient when it is needed again.
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Algorithm 5.2 Extension Field Multiplication with Subfield Reduction
Require: A(x) =
∑
aix
i, B(x) =
∑
bix
i ∈ GF (23917)/P (x), where P (x) = xm −
ω; ai, bi ∈ GF (239); 0 ≤ i < 17
Ensure: C(x) =
∑
cix
i = A(x)B(x), ci ∈ GF (239)
1: Define z[w] to mean the w-th 8-bit word of z
2: ci ← 0
3: if i 6= 16 then
4: for j ← m− 1 downto i + 1 do
5: ci ← ci + ai+m−jbj
6: end for
7: ci ← 2ci – multiply by ω = 2
8: end if
9: for j ← i downto 0 do
10: ci ← ci + ai−jbj
11: end for
12: ci ← ci[2] ∗ 50 + ci[1] ∗ 17 + ci[0] – begin reduction, Equation (5.3)
13: t ← ci[1] ∗ 17 – begin Equation (5.4)
14: if t ≥ 256 then
15: t ← t[0] + 17
16: end if
17: ci ← ci[0] + t – end Equation (5.4)
18: if ci ≥ 256 then
19: ci ← ci[0] + 17
20: if ci ≥ 256 then
21: ci ← ci[0] + 17
22: terminate
23: end if
24: end if
25: ci ← ci − 239
26: if ci ≤ 0 then
27: ci ← ci + 239
28: end if
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5.4.3 Inversion
Inversion in the OEF is performed via a modification of the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm [IT88]
as shown in [GP01], which reduces the problem of extension field inversion to subfield
inversion. The algorithm computes an inverse in GF (p17) as A−1 = (Ar)−1Ar−1 where
r = (p17 − 1)/(p− 1) = 11 . . . 10p. Algorithm 5.3 shows the details of this method. A
key point is that Ar ∈ GF (p) and is therefore an 8-bit value [LN83]. Therefore the
step shown in line 10 is only a partial extension field multiplication, as all coefficients
of Ar other than b0 are zero. Inversion of A
r in the 8-bit subfield is performed via
table look-up.
The most costly operation is the computation of Ar. Because the exponent is
fixed, an addition chain can be derived to perform the exponentiation. For m = 17,
the addition chain requires 4 multiplications and 5 exponentiations to a pi-th power.
The element is then inverted in the subfield, and then multiplied back in as shown in
steps 11 and 12 of Algorithm 5.3. This operation results in the multiplicative inverse
A−1.
The Frobenius map raises a field element to the p-th power. In practice, this
automorphism is evaluated in an OEF by multiplying each coefficient of the element’s
polynomial representation by a “Frobenius constant,” determined by the field and its
irreducible binomial. A list of the constants used is shown in Table 5.4. To raise
a given field element to the pi-th power, each aj, j = 0, 1, . . . , 16, coefficient are
multiplied by the corresponding constant in the subfield GF (239).
Thus we have efficient methods for both the exponentiation and subfield inver-
sion required in Algorithm 5.3. Our results in Section 5.6 show the ratio of extension
field multiplication time to extension field inversion time is 1:4.8. This ratio indicates
that an affine representation of the curve points offers better performance than the
corresponding projective-space approach, which eliminates the need for an inversion
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Table 5.4: Frobenius constants B(x) = A(x)p
i
Exponent
Coefficient p p2 p4 p8
a0 1 1 1 1
a1 132 216 51 211
a2 216 51 211 67
a3 71 22 6 36
a4 51 211 67 187
a5 40 166 71 22
a6 22 6 36 101
a7 36 101 163 40
a8 211 67 187 75
a9 128 132 216 51
a10 166 71 22 6
a11 163 40 166 71
a12 6 36 101 163
a13 75 128 132 216
a14 101 163 40 166
a15 187 75 128 132
a16 67 187 75 128
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Algorithm 5.3 Inversion Algorithm in GF ((28 − 17)17)
Require: A ∈ GF (p17)
Ensure: B ≡ A−1 mod P (x)
1: B0 ← Ap = A(10)p
2: B1 ← B0A = A(11)p
3: B2 ← (B1)p2 = A(1100)p
4: B3 ← B2B1 = A(1111)p
5: B4 ← (B3)p4 = A(11110000)p
6: B5 ← B4B3 = A(11111111)p
7: B6 ← (B5)p8 = A(1111111100000000)p
8: B7 ← B6B5 = A(1111111111111111)p
9: B8 ← (B7)p = A(11111111111111110)p
10: b ← B8A = Ar−1A = Ar
11: b ← b−1 = (Ar)−1
12: B ← bB8 = (Ar)−1Ar−1 = A−1
8-bit Implementation 30
in every group operation at the expense of many more multiplications.
5.4.4 Point Multiplication
As discussed in Section 4.3, the algorithm developed by de Rooij is used for point
multiplication. The parameter choices for this algorithm are crucial to balance storage
requirements and speed gains. Two obvious choices for an 8-bit architecture are
b = 216 and b = 28, since dividing the exponent into radix b words is essentially free as
they align with the memory structure. This results in a precomputation count of 9 and
18 points, respectively. The tradeoff here is the cost of memory access vs. arithmetic
speeds. As we double the number of precomputed points, the algorithm operates
only marginally faster, as shown in [dR98], but the arithmetic operations are easier
to perform on the 8-bit microcontroller. Moreover, as the number of precomputed
points grows, the cost to access the memory in which the points are stored grows,
outweighing the benefits of further precomputation. Even though the XRAM may
be physically internal to the microcontroller, it is outside the natural address space,
and thus is more expensive to access than internal RAM.
For b = 216, we must perform 16-bit multiplication and modular reduction, but
only need to store 9 precomputed points and 9 temporary points. For b = 28, however,
we must now store 18 precomputed points and 18 temporary points, but now only
have to perform 8-bit multiplication and modular reduction. Implementation results
show that the speed gain from doubling the precomputations and the faster 8-bit
arithmetic slightly outweighs the cost of the increase in data access, as shown in
Section 5.6, assuming a microcontroller with enough XRAM is available.
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5.5 Implementation Details
Implementing ECCs on the 8051 is a challenging task. The processor has only 256
bytes of internal RAM, and only the lower 128 bytes are directly addressable. The
upper 128 bytes must be referenced through the use of the two pointer registers: R0
and R1. Accessing this upper storage takes more time per operation and incurs more
overhead in manipulating the pointers. To make matters worse, the lower half of the
internal RAM must be shared with the system registers and the stack, thus leaving
fewer memory locations free. XRAM may be utilized, but there is essentially only
a single pointer for these operations, which are typically at least three times slower
than their internal counterparts.
This configuration makes the 8051 a tight fit for an ECC. Each curve point
in our group occupies 34 bytes of RAM, 17 bytes each for the X and Y coordinates.
To make the system as fast as possible, the most intensive field operations, such as
multiplication, squaring, and inversion, operate on fixed memory addresses in the
faster, lower half of RAM. During a group operation, the upper 128 bytes are divided
into three sections for the two input and one output curve points, while the available
lower half of RAM is used as a working area for the field arithmetic algorithms. A
total of four 17-byte coordinate locations are used, starting from address 3Ch to 7Fh,
the top of lower RAM. This is illustrated in Table 5.5.
Finally, six bytes, located from 36h to 3Bh, are used to keep track of the curve
points, storing the locations of each curve point in the upper RAM. Using these
pointers, we can optimize algorithms that must repeatedly call the group operation,
often using the output of the previous step as an input to the next step. Instead
of copying a resulting curve point from the output location to an input location,
which involves using pointers to move 34 bytes around in upper RAM, we can simply
change the pointer values and effectively reverse the inputs and outputs of the group
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Table 5.5: Internal RAM memory allocation
Address Function
00–07h Registers
08–14h de Rooij Algorithm Variables
15–35h Call Stack (variable size)
36–3Bh Pointers to Curve Points in Upper RAM
3C–7Fh Temporary Field Element Storage
80–E5h Temporary Curve Point Storage
E6–FFh Unused
operation.
The arithmetic components are all implemented in handwritten, loop-unrolled
assembly. This results in large, but fast and efficient program code, as shown in
Table 5.7. Note that the execution times are nearly identical to the code size, an
indication of their linear nature. Each arithmetic component is written with a clearly
defined interface, making them completely modular. Thus, a single copy of each
component exists in the final program, as each routine is called repeatedly.
Extension field inversion is constructed using a number of calls to the other
arithmetic routines. The group operation is similarly constructed, albeit with some
extra code for point equality and inverse testing. The binary-double-and-add and
de Rooij algorithms were implemented in C, making calls to the group operation
assembly code when needed. Looping structures were used in both programs as the
overhead incurred is not as significant as it would be inside the group operation
and field arithmetic routines. The final size and architecture requirements for the
programs are shown in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: Program size and architecture requirements
Type Size (bytes) Function
Code 13K Program Storage
Internal RAM 183 Finite Field Arithmetic
External RAM 306 Temporary Points
34 Integer Multiplicand
Fixed Storage 306 Precomputed Points
5.6 Results
Our target microcontroller is the Infineon SLE44C24S, an 8051 derivative with 26 kilo-
bytes of ROM, 2 kilobytes of EEPROM, and 512 bytes of XRAM. This XRAM is in
addition to the internal 256 bytes of RAM, and its use incurs a much greater delay,
as noted in Section 5.4.4. However, this extra memory is crucial to the operation of
the de Rooij algorithm which requires the manipulation of several precomputed curve
points.
The Keil PK51 tools were used to assemble, debug and time the algorithms,
since we did not have access to a simulator for the Infineon smart card microcon-
trollers. Thus, to perform timing analysis a generic Intel 8051 was used, running at
12 MHz. Given the optimized architecture of the Infineon controller, an SLE44C24S
running at 5 MHz is roughly speed equivalent to a 12 MHz Intel 8051.
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Table 5.7: Finite field arithmetic performance on a 12 MHz 8051
Time a Code Size
Description Operation (µsec) (bytes)
Multiplication C(x) = A(x)B(x) 5084 5110
Squaring C(x) = A(x)2 3138 3259
Addition C(x) = A(x) + B(x) 266 360
Subtraction C(x) = A(x)−B(x) 230 256
Inversion C(x) = A(x)−1 24489 b
Scalar Mult. C(x) = sA(x) 642 666
Scalar Mult. by 2 C(x) = 2A(x) 180 257
Scalar Mult. by 3 C(x) = 3A(x) 394 412
Frobenius Map C(x) = A(x)p
i
625 886
Partial Multiplication c0 of A(x)B(x) 303 305
Subfield Inverse c = a−1 4 236
a Time calculated averaging over at least 5,000 executions with random inputs
b Inversion is a collection of calls to the other routines and has negligible size itself.
Using each of the arithmetic routines listed in Table 5.7, the elliptic curve
group operation takes 39.558 msec per addition and 43.025 msec per doubling on
average on the 12 MHz Intel 8051.
Using random exponents, we achieve a speed of 8.37 seconds for point multi-
plication using binary-double-and-add. This is exactly what would be predicted given
the speed of point addition and doubling. If we fix the curve point and use the de
Rooij algorithm discussed in Section 4.3, we achieve speeds of 1.95 seconds and 1.83
seconds, for 9 and 18 precomputations, respectively. This is a speed-up factor of well
over four when compared to general point multiplication. Unfortunately, our target
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Table 5.8: Elliptic curve performance on a 12 MHz 8051
Operation Method Time (msec)
Point Addition 39.558
Point Double 43.025
Point Multiplication Binary Method 8370
Point Multiplication de Rooij w/9 precomp. 1950
Point Multiplication de Rooij w/18 precomp. 1830
microcontroller, the SLE44C24S, only has 512 bytes of XRAM where we manipulate
our precomputed points. Since we require 34 bytes per precomputed point, 18 tem-
porary points will not fit in the XRAM, limiting us to 9 temporary points on this
microcontroller. These results are summarized in Table 5.8.
If we were to expand our focus beyond smart cards, we could choose one of the
many 8051 derivatives. For example, Dallas Semiconductor offers an 8051 designed
for security applications that can be clocked as fast as 33 MHz [Dal]. Furthermore,
this processor has an enhanced core similar to the Infineon processor that was the
focus of this implementation. In total, this chip could execute a point multiplication
over 6 times faster than the results above. This implementation would result in a
fixed point multiplication in under 400 msec on a chip that is pin for pin compatible
with an 8051. It is accepted that a 33 MHz clock is not found in a typical 8051, but it
is mentioned to underscore that strong cryptographic operations are possible in these
modest processors using these techniques.
Chapter 6
16-bit Implementation
6.1 Introduction to the MC68328
The second implementation is targeted towards the pervasive Palm computing plat-
form. These devices dominate the handheld organizer field through a combination of
low cost and long battery life. A pair of AAA batteries can typically power one of
these devices for several weeks due to aggressive power management built around a
low power 16-bit processor. In typical applications, the processor is in a sleep mode
over 99% of the time, awakening only when the user prompts it into action via the
touch screen or other button.
While these devices have many communication capabilities, they are com-
pletely lacking in security. All user data, including those marked “private” are stored
in the clear, protected only with trivial password-based methods [Ats00]. The pass-
word is stored on the Palm and transmitted to the host PC encoded using a simple
reversible function. Therefore, access to either the Palm or PC results in the knowl-
edge of both the “private” data and the password itself. The absence of strong
36
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public-key security is a direct result of the lack of CPU (and battery) power. Utiliz-
ing traditional algorithms would incur unacceptable delays and increase the battery
drain.
The specific processor behind the Palm is the Motorola Dragonball, an updated
low-power member of the 68000 family. These embedded CPUs operate at clock
frequencies between 15 and 25 MHz, but, as stated earlier, achieve long battery life
by sleeping for a majority of the time.
It is important to note that while a specific processor was chosen here, the
implementation is optimized solely for its specific word size. Thus this research is
applicable to any 16-bit processor.
6.2 Field Order
Because the processor has a native 16-bit word size, and thus a 16-bit integer mul-
tiplier, we should choose an OEF with a subfield of this size. While many pseudo-
Mersenne primes exist in this range, we also need to keep in mind the size of the
extension degree and the existence of a suitable irreducible binomial. A list of possi-
ble fields can be found in the appendix of [BP01]. Because the Dragonball provides
us with a bit more processing power than the 8051, we can choose a larger field order
that would provide a degree of security comparable to RSA 1024. An OEF that meets
all these requirements is GF ((213−1)13) with the irreducible binomial P (x) = x13−2.
This construction yields a field order of about 2169. In [LV00a], the authors argue
that 169-bit ECC keys are adequate for commercial security until the year 2013.
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6.3 Algorithms
The implementation of an ECC over GF ((213 − 1)13) closely follows the methods
described in the previous chapter. For that reason, only the algorithmic differences
between the two will be highlighted here.
Subfield reduction is handled differently in this implementation than it is in
Section 5.4 for the 8-bit microcontroller. As can be seen in [Mot93], the MC68328
supports a native 32-bit divide instruction which will be utilized instead of the normal
OEF subfield reduction. More about this will be discussed in Section 6.4. Subfield
inversion is performed using a look-up table.
6.3.1 Multiplication
Like the 8-bit implementation, extension field multiplication is implemented as poly-
nomial multiplication with a reduction modulo the irreducible binomial P (x) =
x13 − 2. The modular reduction is implemented using the observation that xm ≡
ω mod xm − ω. Thus the product C is computed using the same general struc-
ture as Algorithm 5.1 in Chapter 5 but with the specific constants applicable for
GF ((213 − 1)13), substituted appropriately.
During the calculation of each coefficient ck of C, the inner products aibj are
allowed to accumulate producing the maxima shown in Table 6.1 after extension field
reduction, but before any subfield reduction.
The MC68328 microprocessor supports a native division operation:
32-bit dividend / 16-bit divisor → 16-bit quotient and 16-bit remainder [Mot93].
Thus, this is a special case where modular reduction may be performed directly.
The performance implications of this choice are discussed in Section 6.4. If such an
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Table 6.1: Inner product maximum value – 16-bit case
1. one subfield multiplication with a maximum value of (p− 1)2 = 67076100
2. we accumulate 13 products, 12 of which are multiplied by ω = 2
3. ACCmax = 25(p− 1)2 = 1676902500 < 232
operation were not available in the processor, the normal OEF subfield reduction
would be employed.
A second variant of the extension field multiplication uses the Karatsuba
method introduced in Chapter 4. The Karatsuba algorithm calculates a polynomial
multiplication trading inner products for more additions and subtractions. Care must
be taken not to have any negative intermediate sums as these would not be reduced
correctly modulo p. The solution is to perform a subtraction by x as an addition of
p− x.
A single iteration of Karatsuba is implemented by splitting the field elements
A and B:
A(x) = AHx
7 + AL
B(x) = BHx
7 + BL
These four polynomials are used to calculate the following products:
D0(x) = AL(x)×BL(x)
D1(x) = AH(x)×BH(x)
D0,1(x) = (AH(x) + AL(x))× (BH(x) + BL(x))
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The product C(x) = A(x)×B(x) is finally calculated by:
C(x) = D1(x)x
14 + (D0,1(x)−D1(x)−D0(x))x7 + D0(x)
Compared to the schoolbook multiplication method which requires m2 = 169
inner products, this method requires 62 + 2(72) = 134 inner products.
6.3.2 Inversion
The addition chain for ITI inversion in GF ((213 − 1)13) is shown in Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1 Inversion Algorithm in GF ((213 − 1)13)
Require: A ∈ GF (p13)
Ensure: B ≡ A−1 mod P (x)
1: B0 ← Ap = A(10)p
2: B1 ← B0A = A(11)p
3: B2 ← (B1)p2 = A(1100)p
4: B3 ← B2B1 = A(1111)p
5: B4 ← (B3)p4 = A(11110000)p
6: B5 ← B4B3 = A(11111111)p
7: B6 ← (B5)p4 = A(111111110000)p
8: B7 ← B6B3 = A(111111111111)p
9: B8 ← (B7)p = A(1111111111110)p
10: b ← B8A = Ar−1A = Ar
11: b ← b−1 = (Ar)−1
12: B ← bB8 = (Ar)−1Ar−1 = A−1
The cost of the algorithm can be analyzed easily. The addition chain to cal-
culate Ar requires 4 extension field multiplications and 5 exponentiations to a pi-th
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power. Then a partial multiplication and a scalar multiplication are required to com-
plete the inverse. The subfield inverse in step 11 is completed via table look-up as
will be discussed in Section 6.4.
6.3.3 Point Multiplication
As with the 8-bit field, the method developed by de Rooij is used to speed-up
point multiplication. This method uses an addition chain and a number of pre-
computed points. As mentioned in Section 5.4.4 the number of precomputed points
is a time/space tradeoff. Each precomputed point occupies 52 bytes of memory. Fur-
thermore, during execution, additional temporary space is required. This is detailed
in Section 6.4.
For the MC68328, three possible base sizes are likely: b = 232, b = 216, and
b = 28. These would result in 6, 11, and 22 precomputations and speed-up factors of
3.4, 4 and 4.6 respectively [dR98]. Outside of these base sizes the algorithm benefits
increase marginally. Furthermore, the cost of handling a base smaller than 8 bits
would incur additional costs as the natural byte boundaries can not be used to divide
the exponent.
6.4 Implementation Details
For purposes of comparison, three versions of the extension field multiplication al-
gorithm are implemented in C. First, the schoolbook method is implemented using
two nested loops. Second, the same algorithm is completely unrolled by providing
code to calculate each inner product. This eliminates the logic surrounding the loop
structures and allows the memory offsets to be fixed at design time. Since the target
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platform possesses ample storage for code and data, the relative code size of each of
these implementations is less important than run-time performance.
One notable exception is the use of a look-up table for subfield inversion. This
table contains p − 1 entries, each 16 bits, resulting in over 16 kilobytes of space
for inversion. If space requirements are tight, then the extended binary Euclidean
algorithm is used to calculate the subfield inverses at an increased run-time cost, but
without the need for a large look-up table.
Finally, the Karatsuba method as described in Section 6.3.1 with one iteration
is implemented. First the three D polynomials are generated and, from them, C is
calculated. This implementation requires more memory than the previous algorithms
as the coefficients of D must be stored.
As mentioned in Section 6.3 the processor supports a 32-bit division instruc-
tion. Because in this special case the inner product accumulation does not exceed the
32-bit double word as shown in Section 6.3.1, the processor’s native divide instruction
can be utilized to compute the reduction efficiently. If the code is written in assem-
bly, the special OEF reduction should be slightly faster than the divide instruction.
Combined with the possibility of a faster Karatsuba realization, this suggests further
work in that area.
As stated in Section 6.3.3 the de Rooij method requires 52 bytes of storage per
precomputed point. During execution of the algorithm, another 52 bytes of RAM per
precomputed point are required for temporary storage. For the two most promising
bases b = 216 and b = 28, the storage requirements, in bytes, are 594 permanent, 702
temporary for b = 216 and 1188 permanent and 1296 temporary for b = 28. Since 2.5
kilobytes of RAM is not excessive for a Palm application, it is recommended to use
b = 28. If multiple points are to be stored however, it might be reasonable to use a
larger basis to save on storage.
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6.5 Results
The development environment used for the Palm was the Metrowerks Codewarrior
for Palm OS. This environment allows for the full simulation, debugging and timing
of programs on the actual device. The timings for extension field multiplication are
shown in Table 6.2. These results were measured using a Palm Vx, which contains
an MC68328EZ running at 20 MHz.
Table 6.2: Finite field multiplication performance on a 20 MHz MC68328EZ
Description Time (msec) a
Looped C 2.41
Unrolled C 1.32
Karatsuba 2.34
a Time calculated averaging over at least 10,000 executions with random inputs
Since the most expensive operation in an ECC is extension field multiplica-
tion, only this core routine is implemented on the target platform. We note that
by using the Itoh-Tsujii Algorithm for inversion, the inversion cost is dominated by
multiplication. From this metric, it is trivial to calculate the cost of squarings and
inversion as multiples of multiplication. Furthermore, the experimental results from
the full 8-bit implementation on the 8051 verify our estimations as to the complexity
of the group operation and, in turn, point multiplication. Therefore it is important
to note that the following results are estimated based on the calculated complexity.
Implementation results from Section 5.6 show that the ratio of extension field
multiplication to inversion is 1:4.8 for the 8-bit implementation. This matches with
the anticipated value as inversion requires 4 full multiplications, and a number of extra
calculations which have a cost comparable to scalar multiplication. By comparing
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Algorithms 5.3 and 6.1, we can observe the complexity of extension field inversion for
the 8-bit field is identical to the complexity of extension field inversion for the 16-bit
field, in terms of finite field operations. Thus we will use the same ratio of 1:4.8
for multiplication vs. inversion in the 16-bit field. If the extended binary Euclidean
algorithm is used for subfield inversion instead of a look-up table, the ratio would
have to be increased appropriately.
The group operation complexities are exactly the same as in the 8-bit field
for point addition and doubling. The time-critical operations in an addition are an
inversion, two multiplications and a squaring. Adding in the extra functions, this
results in a ratio of 8 extension field multiplications to a point addition. A point
doubling requires an extra squaring and two scalar multiplications resulting in a ratio
of approximately 9 extension field multiplications to a point doubling.
Using these ratios and the timing results in Table 6.2 for the fastest multi-
plication implementation, a time of 10.6 msec and 11.9 msec is estimated for point
addition and doubling, respectively.
Using random exponents and the binary-double-and-add algorithm, we can
expect an average time of 2.9 seconds for a point multiplication. If the point is fixed,
we can take advantage of precomputation and the algorithm developed by de Rooij
as discussed in Section 4.3. With 22 precomputations, a point multiplication takes
an estimated 630 milliseconds. These results are summarized in Table 6.3.
It should be noted that additional performance gains could be obtained by
optimizing the Karatsuba implementation. Using unrolled optimized assembly to
implement recursive Karatsuba [WP01] should result in the most speed efficient design
using the techniques presented here.
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Table 6.3: Estimated elliptic curve performance on a 20 MHz MC68328EZ
Operation Method Time (msec)
Point Addition 10.6
Point Double 11.9
Point Multiplication Binary Method 2900
Point Multiplication de Rooij w/11 precomp. 725
Point Multiplication de Rooij w/22 precomp. 630
Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Summary
We have demonstrated that a scalar multiplication of a fixed point of an EC can
be performed in under 2 seconds on an 8051 microcontroller, in a field of order ap-
proximately 2134. This is the core operation for signature generation in the ECDSA
scheme. Although the performance and security threshold may not allow the use of
our implementation in all smart card applications, we believe that there are scenar-
ios where these parameters offer an attractive alternative to more costly smart cards
with coprocessors, especially if public-key capabilities are added to existing systems.
We also believe that this implementation can be further improved. In practice, a
smart card with an 8051-derived microcontroller that can be clocked faster than the
5 MHz assumed in Section 5.6 can potentially yield point multiplication times which
are below one second.
The 16-bit implementation demonstrated how these techniques can be ex-
tended to a more powerful embedded microcontroller. The crucial step is choosing
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the OEF that best meets the design criteria for field order and computational com-
plexity. We estimate an ECDSA signature operation in under 700 milliseconds on a
Palm handheld organizer in a field of order approximately 2169. This performance and
security threshold allow its deployment in a large variety of applications. In addition,
this field could be implemented efficiently in a 16-bit smart card microcontroller such
as the Infineon SLE66C80S to provide a more secure implementation than the 8-bit
field. In both of these cases, designing the core implementation routines in assembly
would allow for the full speed gains to be realized. Further, the use of an elliptic
curve defined over the prime subfield, as suggested in [KMKH99], could also provide
a speedup. Each of these potential improvements provides further possibilities to
apply the fast field arithmetic provided by an OEF to construct ECCs on embedded
microcontrollers without additional coprocessors.
7.2 Conclusions
The following insights are the main achievements of this research:
• We have found that OEFs are good arithmetic structures to use as the under-
lying finite field in ECCs on embedded microprocessors.
• Postponing the subfield modular reduction during multiplication is an efficient
practice on the embedded µPs investigated.
• A careful choice of the underlying finite field, and a combination of optimization
techniques, can result in acceptable performance of ECCs on the µPs investi-
gated without the need for specialized coprocessors.
Chapter 8
Future Research
In this chapter we will present an overview of the opportunities for continuation of
the work in this thesis. The following ideas came about during this research but were
beyond the scope of this work.
8.1 Optimized 16-bit Implementation
The implementation of extension field multiplication for the 16-bit field was written
entirely in the standard C language. While this makes the implementation portable,
it often does not result in the most efficient code. Most notably, the Karatsuba
implementation seemed to be most affected by this design choice. Once a target
platform is chosen, an optimized assembly implementation might yield a significant
improvement. Given the direct relation of extension field multiplication performance
to the performance of the ECC as a whole, this additional effort would be justified.
Also, it would be worthwhile comparing, in detail, the exploitation of the pseudo-
Mersenne primes for subfield modulo reduction to the division used in Section 6.4.
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8.2 Elliptic Curve Enhancements
Several possibilities exist relating to the elliptic curve component of the implemen-
tation. First, OEFs can be implemented over Koblitz curves [KMKH99], simplifying
the point multiplication operation. Alternatively, we could utilize Montgomery’s EC
multiplication method to enhance the group operation speed. Briefly, this method
calculates only the x coordinate in the EC group operation and later determines the
corresponding y coordinate.
Furthermore, this work could be continued by comparing these results to im-
plementations of the curves proposed by NIST in Appendix 6 of [NIS00] on similar
8-bit and 16-bit processors.
8.3 Discrete Log Cryptosystems over OEFs
Finally, the application of OEFs is not limited to ECCs. If we extend our scope, we
can apply OEFs to systems based on the discrete log problem as described in [IEE01].
A similar approach is presented in [LV00b]. This would allow the efficient implemen-
tation of these algorithms using the techniques presented in this work. Fields of much
higher order would be required, (approximately 1024–2048 bits long) but the tech-
niques for fast extension field multiplication and inversion would remain valid. This
would enhance the performance of these systems and make their efficient implemen-
tation possible on smaller devices.
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